SACRED TRIADS: AUGUSTINE
AND THE INDO-EUROPEAN SOUL

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1. Introduction

In the following paper I shall endeavour to bring together discussions of Georges Dumézil's thesis concerning the tripartite structure of Indo-European mythology with discussions of Trinitarian theology. My claim will be first of all that the mythology led to an intrinsically aporetic characterization of the soul as a sphere of 'self government in space'. Second, that Plato, initially, and then much more emphatically Augustine, dissolved this construction and resolved its aporias by substituting an alternative construction in terms of 'government by the other through time.'

2. Dumézil's Thesis

The French historian of religions, Georges Dumézil, who traced his intellectual lineage from the Durkheimian school of sociology, is famous for his thesis concerning the prevalence of a specific sort of tripartite system of classification common to all ancient Indo-European cultures, and presumed to trace back to a common ethnic-cultural-linguistic stock. According to Dumézil's first formulation, the classification was derived from the division of the lost original culture into three estates or social groupings, the first concerned with modes of legal, magical or religious ruling; the second with defending and policing society by force of arms, the third with provision of food and other material needs or luxuries.[1] This formal hierarchy was assumed to bind together an *urstaat*, not a series of small localized societies—which, one may note, are more marked by egalitarianism and a less alienated mode of bonding which consists in the preservation of the same identical marks on persons and things.[2] In Durkheimian fashion, Dumézil

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considered that the characteristic representation of the sacred within Indo-European Society was a projection of the social order into the heavens: thus he claimed that the gods also were divided into three estates, in so far as they were patrons of, or themselves enacted, the functions of ruling, warfare and cultivation (the latter being taken to include sexuality). These three divine functions were assigned by Dumézil for convenience the names of three Romans deities: Jupiter (king of the gods), Mars (god of war), and Quirinus (god of agriculture).

Later in his career, however, Dumézil became much more cautious about the socially determinative aspect of his thesis, and indeed about how far such a symbolic order had really been socially instantiated. He often seemed now to claim no more than the presence of an ideology floating free of the social facts—a circumstance which some commentators have found some-what implausible, and yet should not be too quickly dismissed.[3] Such an ideology might arise for example, from the *aspirations* of a ruling/fighting caste, especially if the agricultural and labouring classes were an alien, conquered or semi-conquered people. Or again there may have persisted memories of much earlier sacral *urstaaten*, evidenced by the megalithic monuments of the European North-West. Whatever one's judgement here, it is clear that the later Dumézil made only the minimal claim for a common fundamental tripartite ideology, no longer regarded as a projection from preceding social facts, and with an often unknown degree of instantiation in those facts.

Dumézil appeared in addition to think that the most ancient mythic manifestations of this tripartite division were socio-spatial and cosmic-transcendent in character. The three-fold order of society is taken as reflect-ing a three-fold order in nature. However, he also claimed that at a later stage the soul-body compound in the individual, and then the soul taken alone, receive the same triadic imprint: the head or reason is seen as ruling the stomach or bowels, seat of the passions, with the auxiliary help of the heart, seat of human power and strength (and sense of self-importance, honour, and the claim to *recognition*).[4] Again at a later stage, time is pressed within a fundamentally spatial matrix, so that theories of the stages of human life start to emerge: childhood governed by the emotions, youth by force and strength, old age by wisdom. This sort of notion has been most fully developed on the Indian sub-continent, where these three stages corres-pond respectively to the caste-functions of *Vaisya-Sudra* (traders/cultivators), *Kshattriya* (warriors) and *Brahmana* (rulers). Even the course of collective history can be constrained within this scheme, and indeed this is what engenders the *cyclic* character of the Platonic account of historical time: over the ages democratic, oligarchic and aristocratic/monarchic regimes succeed each other, respectively dominated by emotion, force (*thumos*) and reason.[5] However, as reason is the *true* governing factor, democratic and oligarchic regimes are doomed to find themselves lacking in rule and so to collapse.

But even a properly governed, aristocratic polity, where reason dominates, cannot last forever, because the extent of reason's power over force and the passions is inherently limited: in so far as they are inferior spheres, subordinate to reason, they are, just for this reason, extra-rational and irrepressibly insubordinate. The 'paradox of hierarchy', according to which the lower stages of a hierarchical structure must contain a mirroring inversion of the overall hierarchical order—so that in this case, in the lower region, passion dominates reason—is here in full force.[6] It is his sense of this paradox which causes Plato in *The Republic* to discuss the way in which governing rule, with fatal necessity over time, is contaminated and compromised by what it seeks to govern. In doing so, he brings to light (if we are to follow Dumézil's thesis) both the Indo-European recommendation of order and the Indo-European paranoia concerning disorder which follows from the very mode of this recommendation.

3. Objections to Dumézil

However, there are three main possible objections that may be brought against Dumézil. The first is that the evidence for an all-embracing tripartite ideology outside the case of India is incomplete and often scanty. For example, while there are a few indications that the Norse gods were once divided into three, the evidence is much less conclusive than Dumézil claimed.[7] Yet, against Dumézil's over-zealous critics, it must be insisted that where traces of tripartite ideology do occur they are often very marked and unambiguous: not only do we have, for example, Caesar's remarks that Gallo-Celtic society was divided into Druids, warriors and farmers, but also three-fold classifications of medical cures and categories of wrong-doing.[8] The latter two instances especially suggest that tripartition is more than a 'natural' division for society or the self, but in the Indo-European case was consciously encouraged and applied systematically to every field of endeavour. Nevertheless, the question of whether tripartition was the dominant or sole ideology in all Indo-European cultures, or even for a mooted original Indo-European 'homeland', has to remain far more open than Dumézil was prepared to admit.

The second objection, voiced mainly by English anthropologists, concerns just that claim already alluded to, namely that Dumézil's triads are so natural and obvious as to be well-nigh universal rather than culture-specific. All societies have to work, to defend and police themselves, and rule themselves by legal decree or magical superstition in addition to naked force. Likewise, every human individual experiences himself in terms of his desires, needs and passions as well as the disciplinary power he can exert over others and himself, and finally of intellect which imposes pattern and order upon his experience. To back up this claim that tripartition is but truism and banality, counter-examples were cited against Dumézil: for example, in a

famous BBC Third Programme broadcast on the radio in 1953, John Brough
pointed out that the Old Testament God is described as 'enlightening,
strengthening and consoling', thereby exhibiting precisely Dumézil's three
categories, despite the fact that the Hebrews do not (or at least do not fully)
belong to the Indo-European linguistic (and on Dumézil's view linguistic-
cultural) family.[9] However, Dumézil fairly claimed in reply to Brough that
the Old Testament does not contain—for example in its laws—any conscious
reflection on such a three-fold classification of the kind one finds in Plato's
Republic or in Hindu law-codes. More crucially, it exhibits no *hierarchical* ex-
emplification of the scheme, and certainly no ontologised social stratification
of the kind found in India. Dumézil's counter-blast was further buttressed
by others, indicating, for example, that North American Indian mythology
and social organisation are governed by a quite different fourfold pattern of
classification.[10] (It should be noted here that, as in the case of the Indian caste
system, a fourth category can sometimes be detected in the Indo-European
scheme—partially integrated with the third, like the Indian *sudra*—but it
designates the outsider or semi-outsider, the lowest of the low, beneath the
exercise of a regular 'function'; or else a joker-trickster role).[11]

   Despite the suspicions of Brough and others, it can fairly be claimed that
Indo-European societies seem often to have foregrounded a tripartite divi-
sion, reflected upon it, sometimes (as in the case of India) rigidly enforced it,
and in particular to have created strict parallels between a three-fold cosmos,
society and individual soul/body. In addition they seem commonly to have
construed the division as a hierarchical ordering of space: reason being
placed above the passions, but governing them with the help of an auxiliary
which is force or power, an agent whose ambiguously mercenary character
in both person and state has always to be reckoned with. Nonetheless it
should be noted that within this consensus the character of the topmost
function of 'ruling' has been construed very differently in east and west. In
the east, where kingship and the 'asiatic mode of production' has dom-
inated, and gurus have always been equated with kings, the highest rule has
been seen less as *logos* and more as a sort of impersonal super-power which
enables one to be indifferent to all pain and passion, and also *magically* to
control and transform things.[12] Here also the highest stage of life raises the
individual beyond the political into a sphere of private self-sufficient con-
templation which is equated with a maximum degree of power and free-
dom. In the west, by contrast, where more or less independent cities have
flourished and decisively influenced all of western culture, 'rule' has involved
either aristocratic or democratic modes of participated power amongst
equals, such that in consequence the topmost function has been construed as
dikaiosune, a 'just positioning': not rule by a higher force, but rule through
discrimination, or allocation of things to their 'proper' places. This trust in
logos then renders possible the universality of both 'philosophy' in general,
and 'ethics' in particular. Correspondingly, such universality does not, as

in India, break with the political/social sphere, and political practice re-mains an aspect of the highest human life. (Hence those like the Pythagoreans/ Platonists advocating some withdrawal from the *polis* were nonconformists, not standing, like gurus, in a position beyond the social order which is none-theless at its apex; moreover, their philosophic community itself was a kind of counter-*polis*).[13]

The third objection takes us back to the question of the plausibility of a free-floating ideology. Colin Renfrew, among others, has argued for a far older root for Indo-European culture,[14] a claim which is not implausible since evidence from elsewhere (Africa for example) shows that oral cultures tend to be *more* preservative of existing linguistic norms, precisely because they have to expend so much effort in the task of preservation through memory: hence the persistence of striking linguistic similarities over long ages and long distances is only implausible when measured by the norms of linguistic change for post-literate societies. But if Renfrew is right, and Indo-European dispersal was coincident with the spread of farming in the neolithic age, then it would seem that we are dealing with relatively pacific, egalitarian communities without even chieftains, to whom surely even a mere ideology of tripartite hierarchy would be alien. This is Renfrew's conclusion against Dumézil, but two counter-objections can also be raised. First, the early date for dispersal remains conjecture, and lack of archaeological evidence or known reasons for later migrations of armed warriors on horseback (the traditional model for Indo-European dispersion) does not at all render them entirely implausible (there is also no archaeological evidence for some migrations which we know of from written survivals). Second, Renfrew's characterisa-tion of the first agriculturalists is not clearly established: did the displace-ment of the pre-agricultural practices of some by others not involve much conflict, accompanied by organisation and hierarchy?[15] A denial of some form of emerging chieftainship to this era seems unwarrantedly dogmatic. Were such a thing in place, could not certain migrating groups of hunters have been acquainted with and envied hierarchical structures, and perhaps also have borrowed some of their features? It is not implausible to imagine some sort of dialectical interplay between settled sacral-legal power (Dumézil's first function) and a more mobile and aggressive power (Dumézil's second function) at the cusp of transition to the early neolithic age, as well as at a later stage of incursions by armed warriors.[16]

For our purposes here, only the negative conclusions matter: later dispersal cannot be entirely ruled out, and perhaps not even the 'inter-active' rather than dispersive explanation for Indo-European commonality. If dispersal was earlier, than it does not disprove the possibility of an equally early source for the ideology of tripartition. Notably, linguistic experts seem unconvinced by Renfrew's 'weak' construal of the ancient common Indo-European participle *re*: it does indeed seem always to convey strong connotations of a sovereign rule.[17]

4. Dumézil's Thesis and Psychology

As has been mentioned, Dumézil and others have tended to see the application of tripartition to the psychic sphere as a later and secondary matter. Perhaps, however, this can be called into question. The celtic lists of vices which cite jealousy, fear and avarice (respectively vices of cognitive representation, courage and desire) are believed to record a very ancient division, and I have already alluded to the presence of similar schemes in the threefold sins attributed to Heracles, Jason and the Scandinavian (anti)hero Starkadr, in myths with presumably equally ancient roots.[18] This might lead one to ask whether it is not just as likely that primitive peoples would impose the form of a physically experienced human body—in terms of Head, Chest and Belly or other variants—upon society, as that they would construe psycho-somatic life in terms of social class-structure and classstruggle. One example may help to support such a contention. In Indian tradition the three psychological variants—*dharma* (law), *karma* (passion) and *artha* (interest)—or the three 'qualities' or *guna*, namely *sattva* ('Goodness'), *rajas* (passion) and *tamas* (obscurity) are usually seen by commentators as later applications of cosmic-social principles in which *sattva* means sky and government, *rajas* means the dim-horizon of desire, which fuses Dumézil's second and third functions, while *tamas* means the obscurity of the earth, corresponding to the hidden dividend of economic interest (belonging to a shadowy fourth function). However, if we explore the mythic context a little more, we discover that these three cosmic principles are for Hindu myth derived from the divisions of a first sacrificed cosmic *man (Purusa)*: this suggests, therefore, that divisions of the self are co-archetypal with those of society and cosmos and not in any way secondary or evolutionarily later. Such an argument can also be supported by the fact that sometimes the ruling god himself contains the subordinate function. Hence in the *Anabasis* we read that away from home Xenophon omitted to sacrifice to *Zeus Meilichios*, protector of finances, and in consequence found himself short of money, despite being successful in war and command, having remembered to sacrifice to Zeus-King and Zeus-Saviour.[19]

Moreover, there is a further point here to be taken into account; namely, that the three-fold order is often located not merely *within* the respective spaces of the heavens, society and the soul-body complex, but also as an order which *links* all three. Here the heavens fulfil the ruling function, society that of the lower passions and the soul the ambiguous, mediating function of force. Hence, perhaps, one may legitimately speculate, the importance in many Indo-European societies of shamanistic figures and sacred kings: often highly ambiguous figures, regarded as capable of malice as well as of magical benefit. At least these *privileged* souls, therefore, seem always to have held a crucial place within the tripartite fantasy.[20]

Since Dumézil himself appears to have abandoned any strictly sociological notion concerning the primacy of the organisation of the social whole for the development of religious notions, one may assume that the same may apply for conceptions of the inner life and the organisation of the soul. Such a supposition would in turn suggest that the macro-microcosmic patterns of analogy between cosmos, society and human individual, operated as a king of mutually-confirming relay system, for which each site was used to illuminate the other two, and the supposed likeness of all three to each other helped to confirm that each site was indeed internally composed of a hierarchical three-fold order.

5. *Platonic Philosophy and Indo-European Myth*

The last consideration may help to illuminate certain tensions within Platonic philosophy. According to Dumézil himself, Indo-European cultural patterns, including tripartition, are much less marked in the case of Greece than in that of Rome, Scandinavia and India,[21] a circumstance perhaps due to the strong influence of pre-Indo-European elements within the Aegean era and equally to the democratic/military traditions of formal equality or *isonomia* (though the latter constitutes a reduction to bipartition: force over passion—see footnote 21). While this is probably the case, researchers since Dumézil have nonetheless pointed to several elements of tripartition in Greece which he did not allude to: notably in the case of Hesiod's myth of successive human eras as analysed by Jean-Pierre Vernant,[22] and less certainly, but quite plausibly, the three phases of the *Iliad* according to Julian Baldick, which he claims moves from an exposition of Agamemnon's sovereignty, through an account of Hector's battles, to the eventual submission of the mercenary Achilles to Agamemnon's rule.[23] Thus the epic recounts both the internal and external subordination of the third function with the help of the second, since just as Achilles sulks because of the loss of the booty of women (whose fertility belongs with the third function) so also Troy is fighting not on behalf of sovereign rule, but of Paris's adulterous capture of Helen.

However, while the above may be an accurate diagnosis, there is here no explicit and manifest espousal of either political or psychic tripartition, of the kind evidently present in Plato's *Republic*. Here, uniquely for the west, we have a systematic exposition of tripartition and exploration of its *aporias*. Included among the latter is the possibly vicious circularity of what I have called the mutually confirming relay-system, which extrudes in Plato's text as a hesitation between soul and city as alternative starting points. However, this hesitation can itself be read as but one example of an irresolvable yet necessary oscillation in Greek philosophy between 'the near to us' which may include *both* the soul and a little further off the city, and 'the distant' which may mean the city, but is more fundamentally the cosmos.

Philosophical knowledge must be both *manifest* and *complete*, yet only the near is fully manifest, whereas only the distant is fully complete. Hence pre-Socratic beginnings with the 'distance' of the natural cosmos, were quickly succeeded by the Socratic recommencement with what is near: with psychology and politics. Within this recommencement however, the same aporetic hesitation is doomed to re-appear as one between the soul and the city. Perhaps an unambiguous choice for the first foundation awaits Descartes, who in the *Discours* explains that an ideal city is the work of one consciousness, not on account of the *truth* of this consciousness, but rather on account of its greater probable *formal self-consistency* as compared with a work of mutual collaboration.[24]

Plato's Socrates, however, did not yet take this course. Instead, he in advance subverted the Cartesian view of near and far, by making *the city* the near—comparing it to larger, visible letters of the alphabet—and *the soul* the remote: comparing it to small letters scarcely legible.[25] This is in keeping, however, with *one* view of the soul as that which mediates the cosmic and political, traceable through Pythagorean tradition, a view which is perhaps *more* ancient and more Indo-European than the naturalistic accounts of the soul as found in Homer.[26] In Plato's case, however, the soul, to whom the cosmos is somewhat obscure, can nonetheless clarify the cosmic through its access to the supra-cosmic, or realm of the forms. This circumstance tends to make Plato's resolution of the *aporia* between soul and city on the side of the soul—unlike that of Descartes—somewhat disruptive of the Indo-European legacy. For the soul is *not* preferred because of closeness and clarity, but rather on account of the opening upon distance, yet not a simply *palpable* distance; rather a distance only given in the light of the Good, or in other words according to the *ideal excellence* of the forms rather than simply their factuality. Inevitably, therefore, Plato is led in the *Republic* and still more in later dialogues to explain how there is a component of higher desiring, of *eros*, in our cognition of the supra-cosmic realm. Hence, with the ideas both of the invisible sun of the Good, and of the higher *eros*, Plato has disturbed the sovereign priority of rational rule over all passion, together with the essential *immanentism* of this notion, namely that it is a paradigm of self-government or rule of the whole by higher parts of the whole over lesser, which in the case of the soul can only be taken to echo the self-rule of the cosmos. Instead, Plato intimates a kind of rule through *ecstasis*, or more precisely an ecstatic tending towards that which calls things to be by virtue of, and in various degrees of, intrinsic excellence, and *not* towards a mere higher element within the *same* cosmos or totality as oneself, which commands merely through subordination, and not exemplarity.

However, the Platonic subversion of Indo-European ideology is not truly carried through to the end. This is because Plato fails to allow the notion of 'the Good' altogether to cancel the notion of 'justice'. It is clear that, in the *Republic*, the two themes are in tension, since justice is defined purely

immanently as the division of labour, or what pertains when every function, whether psychic or political, sticks to its own appointed role.[27] The problem here is that since the topmost function of 'ruling' holds its place merely in terms of keeping the other two functions in *their* places, ruling appears to be without a quality of its own, and to take on the character, as Socrates' sophistic opponents insinuate, of a mere manipulative oratorical power, more forceful than force itself which is *thumos* (Dumézil's second function).[28] It is the notion of the contemplation by the *logos* of the forms in the light of the Good which succeeds in breaking this *impasse*, yet only by insisting that to be ethical is prior to doing justice, since it consists in the contemplation of the eternal forms altogether without fear or possibility of violation (according to the *Phaedo*),[29] whereas justice is always a *reaction* to the fear of displacement within the psychic or social order. Hence the government of the city or the soul by the vision of the Good lies in *excess* of justice as the division of labour, and rather, as recent commentaries following Gadamer have argued, in the exercise of *phronesis* or the constant improvisation through time of newly appropriate and harmonious actions beyond any *a priori* specifications.[30] And yet, for all this, Plato is not able to allow the notion of the Good, as something manifest in time through the arrival of ever-new participations in its excellence, altogether to displace the notion of justice, which is comparatively static and spatial, and *just for this reason* requires no transcendent referral. (It will be noted that I am here insinuating, against the entire post-Heidegger legacy, that it is autonomous immanentism which points to a false 'metaphysical' suppression of temporality, and *not at all* transcendence and the vision of the Good.) Thus he fully retains, as one aspect of ideality, the subordination of passion and power to reason, and of aggressive, erotic and labouring models of sociality to that of discursive political rule. But to do so is to fail to overcome Indo-European tripartite ideology in three crucial aspects, namely its advocacy of self-government, the aporetic impossibility of this programme, and its construction of an illusory realm of interiority. I shall now more fully characterise these three dimensions.

First of all, self-government. It is this paradigm which defines from the outset both western knowledge and western science. For rule here always operates within a definite whole or totality, whether this be cosmos, city or soul. According to this scheme a single person is not fundamentally governed by another or by his love for another, which other person might be equal to him but different; and what is perhaps most crucial here is that men should not be governed by their love for women. On the contrary, a person can only be legitimately influenced from outside himself, on the Indo-European view, if this outside is in fact the controlling part of a whole within which he is also included. As a *subject* of government, he ceases to be a person in relation, and is reduced to the level of subordinate part which serves the whole. Moreover this authority can be internalized such that the subject can also treat himself as an unfractured spatial whole, hierarchically

arranged. Because my soul is a microcosm of the social macrocosm, I can become self-governing; hence Greek ethics ultimately concerns an economy of self-control within a totality which keeps the passions within bounds and in their right places, and since passion is characteristically encoded as 'female', and reason as 'male' this same scheme neutralises sexual difference by reducing it to a subordinate aspect of a single essential human subjectivity.[31] The alternative that is foreclosed by this scheme is the priority of *relation*, which at once establishes equally the priority of *community*, yet also indicates that one only has community with a genuine other, who is always arriving and is never circumscribable.[32] Within the priority of relation, both the political and psychic whole are dissipated, since relating is a series which continues for ever and is never foreclosed. Again, within this priority, a person's true identity ceases to be defined in terms of the rule of reason over the passions, but consists in the open series of events of signifying and desiring reference to other things and persons. *Both* soul and city in this perspective vanish, since they are only sustained by the vicious mutually supporting relay system of analogy between them—their apparent founding of each other in the principle of 'self-government'.

Secondly, the *aporia* of this principle of self-government. This is none other than the 'paradox of hierarchy' already alluded to. If force and passion must be governed by reason, then reason is not co-terminous with reality, and cannot even reflect all of reality, since something will remain opaque; in the lower reaches of the hierarchy, everything is reversed. Hence in Plato's Republic a chaotic realm will, in time, always contaminate both *logos* and political control. Those who should rule—the philosophers—will not wish to rule, for fear of this contamination.[33] But such fear is in effect a recognition that philosophy's ambition to be a total discourse must remain forever thwarted: its theoretical identification of essential sites of identity will have always to be supplemented by the mere *narration* of the vagaries of force and passion which disturb these sites, rendering 'error' not just a cognitive mistake, but a real and ineliminable *event*. Thus the city that must be ruled by self-governing law, is a city that cannot, for long, be ruled, and the soul that must be healed by self-governing reason is a soul whose mortal sickness can but briefly be allayed.

The third point concerns the construction of an illusory *interiority*. The identification of a vicious relay system between soul, city and cosmos (indicated more sharply when the cosmos is represented as a single man) has revealed that individualism is not a modern deviation, but was on the Indo-European agenda, and perhaps other cultural agendas, from the outset, at least in a latent mode. For as Jean-Luc Nancy has pointed out, one and the same metaphysic of self-government upholds *either* an organic pseudo-community, in which persons are reduced to parts, and there is no openness to new arrivals, or *else* the autonomous liberal subject.[34] The two emphases are in fact reverse ways of solving a second *aporia* of self-government: namely,

whether one stresses the far-off totality which is yet somewhat obscure—strong on government, weak on self—or the seemingly present totality, whose workings are manifest, yet is only problematically all inclusive—strong on self, weak on government. By the same token, philosophy also, if it is taken in its *pre-Socratic* immanentist impulse to reflect the cosmos without reference to the sacred (since it is actually, against Heidegger, the Socratic reinvocation of the sacred which *disturbs* this proto-ontological project) is from the outset latently epistemological and subjectivist, since also enabled by the myth of self-government which includes a moment of perfect self-reflection. This is despite the fact that this myth cannot be philosophically established and includes reason within a *mythos* or narrative that reason can never perfectly master.

These sorts of consideration tend to lend support to the idea that in Indian visions of an original cosmic man, or *purusa*, and likewise, as Louis Dumont argues, in the aspirations of the guru to total liberation, one has a kind of 'other worldly' individualism that is one source for our contemporary 'this worldly' variant.[35] In both the Indian and the Platonic instance, notions of interiority can be interpreted as effects of Indo-European tripartition (while the hero enacts a kind of decapitated 'bipartition'—see note 35). Two things in combination contrive to establish a supposed inviolable interiority: they are hierarchy and heterogeneity. Properly speaking, there are no internal spaces: an internal space is only a fold which can be unfolded and so re-externalised. Every inside can be penetrated because we really remain always on the outside: we go inside a house, because the outer walls fold inwards, while remaining, strictly speaking, exterior. However, notions of hierarchy and heterogeneity help to obfuscate this circumstance. Applied to the soul by Plato, hierarchy suggests that *one* part of the soul, the *nous*, touches the transcendent ideas, while inversely, only the passions touch the subterranean depths of chaos. Hence *force* or *thumos* in the middle is hermetically sealed; it enjoys no unmediated access to the external world, while equally passion has no unmediated access to the above, and reason no unmediated access to the below. This hermetic sealing requires *also* the notion of heterogeneity, or the idea that the three functions of the soul are so generically different that there is no common medium between the three. But this of course renders the *modes* of rational control over force, and of forceful control over desire, entirely invisible and esoteric, fostering in consequence the sophistic suspicion that there only exists the visibility of the more subtle force of trickery, or of a lust for power masquerading as law. (However, it can also be claimed that democratic 'decapitated bipartition', or twofold hierarchy, and even a heterogeneity of two equal powers— Dumézil's 'priestly' and 'kingly' aspects of sovereignty—suffice to generate interiority: see note 35).

I have defined the Indo-European soul, therefore, in terms of an entire concealed mythic apparatus whose components are: 1. self-government; 2. the *aporia* or paradox of hierarchy; 3. the *aporia* of near or distant; 4. the

vicious relay system between soul, city and cosmos; and 5. the constitution of interiority by hierarchy and heterogeneity. Many movements in philosophy, in Plato himself, Aristotle, the Stoics and Plotinus, have helped to qualify or disturb this apparatus, without entirely displacing it. But I now want to show how the terms for its displacement have already, once for all and comprehensively, been long ago set out.

6. *Indo-European Tripartition and the Theology of the Trinity*

Scholars have traced the impact of Indo-European tripartition into the Christian era: for example in the doctrine of three estates: clerical, military and agricultural, which survived beyond the Middle Ages.[36] However, the obvious question of the possible relation of this scheme to that other triad which is the Christian Trinity, seems, oddly, never to have been posed.

In its origins, clearly, the doctrine of the Trinity has nothing to do with Dumézil's triads, nor does the latter affect the course of Trinitarian speculation. The interesting possibility is rather the reverse: namely that Trinitarian theology is an implicit disruption and subversion of Indo-European ideology. This is what I now want to claim, with reference to Augustine and his treatment of the soul in *De Trinitate*.

First of all, one can observe that Augustine's characterization of the three divine persons (or 'somethings' as he says)[37] does loosely approximate the three sites of Indo-European tradition, but not in the expected order. It is God the Father whom Augustine frequently identifies with capacity, the power to create, and the weight of existence,[38] God the Son with *logos* or rational government, and God the Holy Spirit with will or a probing and delighting desire (*dilectio*).[39] Despite this approximation, Augustine's construal of these three sites is entirely novel and disruptive in relation to pre-Christian tradition: first, as is already apparent, because he places power before reason, and second and third because he abolishes both hierarchy and heterogeneity, which means that, in turn, the ground of interiority is dissolved, the *aporias* of self-government vanish, and there is no longer any need for a relay system of mutually confirming analogy, since neither soul, city nor cosmos in their discrete forms can survive this abolition.

Let me take these three points in turn. First, reason no longer controls power, but is itself the infinite manifestation of power. Therefore it no longer needs supplementation by power to reinforce its decrees over desire. *In a sense*, the philosophic *logos* is here purified and *saved* from its subordination to a mythic discourse which narrates the history of its dealings with force and passion, since reason now rules by its own inherent means of peaceful persuasion. The latter is a key term, since Augustine only in this fashion 'saves' philosophy by characterizing reason more as internal speech,[40] something produced in time by power and therefore more akin to a rhetorical logos: and he does, indeed, associate the Trinitarian positions with those of *inventio*,

dispositio and *elocutio* in oratory.[41] Reason, as rooted in an inaccessible divine infinite reason, has now become much more a word which we must first hear, first feel compelled by, before enunciating it in our own fashion.[42] In consequence sophistic suspicion is no longer held at bay by the problematic doctrine of the esoteric compulsion of force by reason, but instead by Augustine's radical liberation of power from the taint of violence: since, for him, unruly force involves conflict, and every conflict some mode of weakening, a harmonious peaceful order is always stronger, and to submit to the powerful word is to receive the gift of reason.[43] Hence while power and reason are not exactly to be identified, reason as infinite is no longer delimited, and concomitantly the field of power is not a literal region or substance outside the sway of reason. Instead, force *exhaustively* manifests itself as order, even though order as infinite is never foreclosed, nor once-and-for-all graspable.

Second, there is no more hierarchy. The Father is not superior in the Godhead to the Son, nor the Son to the Spirit. Thus if Paternal power is manifest in filial order, this order is nonetheless nothing but an infinite effectivity, or something *creative of being as such*: it is that which establishes, ever anew. Likewise, reason is not 'in control' of love, which for Augustine is a passion, albeit a higher one. In a radicalisation of the Platonic subversion and re-founding of philosophy through a doctrine of *eros*, Augustine renders love (which he construes as both donating and desiring, both agapeic and erotic)[44] as the *measure* of reason itself, citing St. Paul's attack on the Greek logos: 'If anyone thinks that he knows anything, he does not know as he ought to know. But if anyone loves God, the same is known by him' (I Cor 8:2–3).[45] For Augustine, the objectifying gaze of philosophy without love produces no truth, but merely satisfies a perverse voyeuristic desire, or *curiositas*.[46] By contrast, only when something is genuinely loved for its goodness, and to an appropriate degree given or allowed to be by us in its goodness, is it truly seen, although this implies inversely that we should love the thing in the light of how we judge it should be. Judgement is something which, as Augustine makes clear in Books eight and nine of *De Trinitate*, arrives afresh with each new circumstance and is not the implementation of *a priori* standards, but the active application of the concrete standard which is Christ—justice incarnate. Indeed its implication with desire shows that to judge truly is nothing but the *aspiration* to judge with infinite, divine exactitude. Desire and Vision have become inseparable, supplying each other.

Third, there is no more heterogeneity. Father, Son and Spirit are not substances, nor qualities, nor accidents, nor aspects of a single substance, into which category Augustine refuses to place God. Instead they are, in terms of essence—meaning both Being itself and Unity itself—[47] identical, and only distinguished by their relations, which, in a fashion impossible for any ontic reality, and therefore impossible for us to conceive, exhaustively characterizes them. The Father *is* without remainder Fatherhood, or the giving to birth of the Son; the Son *is* without remainder the offering of all back to the

Father; The Father and Son together *are* the manifestation of love which does not exist before mutuality, and yet in this mutuality gives itself outside the original dyad as this new possibility of love. Finally, the Holy Spirit *is* this emanating mutuality which only persists in constantly receiving itself from the mutual love of Father and Son.[48] Such a doctrine of substantive relationality, which Augustine first preferred, allows one to construe diversity as a kind of absolute incommunicability—the Father is never in the place of the Son, and so forth—and yet not as a diversity of substance, kind or essence. Hence heterogeneity is here abolished, and the categories of same and different, and of internal to over against external to, are dramatically transgressed.

This reconception of tripartite division in the case of the absolute, or God, is carried over by Augustine into the psychological realm. Famously, Augustine sought to clarify the Trinity by appeal to psychic analogues. However, as Rowan Williams and Lewis Ayres have explained, this attempt has been badly understood and criticized only under misapprehensions.[49] It is not the case that Augustine subordinates our access to the immanent or eternal Trinity via the manifestation of this Trinity in the historical economy —that is to say the Incarnation of the Son, and the giving of the Spirit to the Church—in favour of a pseudo-ontological speculation about the soul. On the contrary, Augustine begins by *radicalizing* a stress that we only have participatory access to the eternal by *remaining within* the structures of space, time and human language.[50] The Trinity is first disclosed to us in these structures, and salvation for Augustine is the event of the disclosure at *one time*, in *particular* relations and *specific* words of how *all* time, relating and speech should *properly* occur. Hence the supposed 'psychological' terms of Augustine's reflections on the Trinity are first of all the metaphors for memory, language and desire ('voice', 'image', 'word', 'food', 'gift', 'flame' etc.), which the New Testament *itself* uses, as indispensable clarifications of the epiphanic events it narrates, and by interrogating these three phenomena, Augustine is at once seeking to clarify the metaphors, *and*—more crucially— seeking to purify the phenomena, in the light of the given metaphorical pattern.

For Augustine, the first key analogical term is not the soul at all, but love. God has been revealed as love, and therefore one must ask, is love itself triune? Augustine finds that it is, and consists of lover, beloved and the love that flows between them.[51] Thus the prime analogue for the Trinity is relational, which is to say, *neither* psychic nor political. However, Augustine proceeds nonetheless to evolve a psychic analogy because, first, the soul is relatively self-sufficient and unified, and so, in this respect *alone*, more like God; secondly, because the beloved is not generated by the lover, like the Son by the Father, whereas the image or word which *intends* the beloved *is* generated in the soul of the lover by memory, which is Augustine's psychic analogue for the Father.[52] However, the fact that, according to Augustine's innovative gnoseology, the inner word is generated as ecstatic knowledge of

something outside the soul (such that it is through and through 'intentional') still preserves the social relations and desiring content. His final analogue of memory, understanding and will means that knowledge of the other is born in recall of the other in the past, and driven by desire of the other in the future.[53] This may seem to be confuted by the fact that Augustine eventually talks of the soul which simply remembers, knows and loves itself as the most exact image of God.[54] Surely we have here the perfecting of a solipsistic interiority? Yet in truth the reverse is the case, because for Augustine to know oneself *genuinely* means to know oneself as loving what one should love— namely God and one's neighbour as oneself.[55] Hence not interiority but radical *exteriorization* is implied—and Augustine therefore uses paradoxical formulations which imply that the soul cannot contain itself.[56] As the soul is memory, and this is always memory of the other, and as, likewise, it is inner word, which as a signifier *is* only in referral to something else, and as, finally, it is love, which is a passion *only* through ecstatic referral, it follows that the soul which recollects, knows and loves itself, only loves itself as God and everything else. The true, imaging soul is a soul crossed-out.

Such a radical critique of interiority is what one might expect if Augustine applies to the soul his obliteration of hierarchy and heterogeneity. However, it appears drastically at variance with received pictures of Augustine as discoverer and virtuoso of the interior sphere. How can my account really be true? What must be argued here, in contrast to Charles Taylor and others, is that Augustine's use of the vocabulary of 'inwardness' is not at all a deepening of Platonic interiority, but something much more like its subversion.[57] An examination of Augustine's texts (especially the *Confessions*) suggests first that inwardness for Augustine involves remaining within our *createdness* and not imagining that some psychic aspect or ourselves is really part of an eternal substance (here it is relevant that there are hints in Augustine of a monistic ontology underlying his apparent dualism, for which soul and body are both 'numbers' representing different degrees of *tonos* or tension).[58] Secondly, and in consequence, it means remaining within *time* and travelling to God by gathering ourselves again through memory, through a tearful *shedding* of ourselves and an expectation governed by right desire. (This 'descent' into an interior which is really our past is itself only a non-identical repetition of the *divine* descent into the darkness of sin in the Incarnation; a descent possible initially only for God precisely because he alone is entirely *exterior* to sin.) In both cases, an exteriorization which turns the soul inside out is involved, because the conditions for autonomous interiority— hierarchy and heterogeneity—have been removed. For Augustine, in the case of the higher *eros*, reason no longer governs passion through the wielding of power in space, but instead the power of memory, the trace of particular events, precedes reason which is in turn overtaken by a future-oriented desire. There is a sequence of before, between and after here, and yet each element is ecstatically implicated in the other two without any hierarchical

priority or heterogeneous difference of isolatable quality or occurrence.[59] For Augustine's strongest insight is not at all that a hermetically-sealed soul is most like the Trinity, but rather that the nearest analogue to Trinitarian substantive relations lies not in any spatial entity, but in the lack of punctuality and the occurrence of aporetic ecstatic inter-involvement between past, present and future, which he was, of course, the first person fully to explicate. Paradigmatically, for Augustine, it is time itself which is most like that which does not change, and the trick is to realise that if the eternal has been given to us as a *gift*, and therefore as that which constantly passes and cannot be held onto, this may reveal that the eternal is in *itself* gift—for Augustine the name of the Holy Spirit, which is the upshot and renewal of reciprocity.[60]

One might indeed argue that it is not, as so often claimed, that Augustine discovers the essence of time to be psychic (a claim obviously incompatible with his clear belief in real, literal, created time) as rather that he sees the ecstatic, folded back upon itself, tracing and projecting character of time, as the condition for psychic life, which is time as aware of itself.[61] And it is this radical temporalization of the soul which ensures that it is the *whole soul* which touches God, no part of the soul being hermetically sealed under a mode of spatial government. Indeed, it is just because there is *no longer* any interiority in this spatial sense, that Augustine does speak of our touching God from within: for if every part of the soul is as near the surface as any other part—memory and desire as much as reason—then conversely this transcendent surface which is God can permeate equally every part of the soul. Just because there is no ontologically sealed inner space, we are more likely to experience God as a welling up from within, or as an invasion and bursting apart of our bounds. Thus in the *Confessions* Augustine supplements metaphors of 'looking' at God, which tends to preserve boundaries with (neoplatonically and eucharistically derived) metaphors of *eating* where the most external becomes the most internal, and of *weeping*, where an accumulation of egotistic 'blocked' interiority surfaces and is 'shed'.

Hence it becomes inadequate to speak simply of the absence or presence of metaphors of interiority. What we need instead is a comparison of different *economies* of interior in relation to exterior. In the Platonic economy, there is a travellable distance from an inviolable interior to the exterior; but in the Augustinian economy there is no distance to travel, because the most exterior is by virtue of that very exteriority also the most interior to us: far from being inviolable, our innermost heart ceases to be *us* at all.[62] This alternative economy depends entirely on the fact that 'the external' is now no longer the highest level of a cosmic whole within which we are also included, but is a genuine transcendent outside any whole, and therefore not hierarchically over-against us, but the giving source by which alone we are at all. Hence cosmos, also, along with soul and city, is here finally crossed out. And since the transcendent is the maximally external which is also the maximally internal, the Indo-European hesitation between near and far is also overcome.

Neither completeness *nor* clarity is available, but instead the infinite is given to us as most near in its very distance, and therefore *a fortiori* there is no more vicious relay system between the three.

It is this more complete overcoming of immanence which permits Augustine also to dispense with Plato's preservation of justice as non-negotiable division of labour, and instead to focus more consistently upon the Good as something ceaselessly mediated to us in time. Here the critique of heterogeneity is crucial: there is, for Augustine, no real external operation of power on reason or reason on desire, since we can also envisage these operations entirely as the mutations of power itself, of signification itself, or else of desire itself. In consequence these operations have become more exoteric and surveyable, and involve no longer a bizarre and finally arbitrary mediation between absolutely diverse qualities.

This same lack of heterogeneity means that the paradox of hierarchy is removed. For now force and passion no longer escape the rule of reason by exercising a pseudo-sovereignty in the lower realms. The aspiration to completeness of the philosophic *logos* is at last therefore fulfillable, and yet this is at the cost of a *merely* philosophical *logos*. For the new *logos* only orders or mirrors in so far as it is *also* powerful and effective, and *also* rightfully desiring of the other. Since reason is for it that which effects or creates, reason can no longer itself guarantee this effectivity, which must rather be a matter of hope. And since reason is for it that which rightfully desires, there must be faith in and love for an ultimate reality which is rightfully desirable.

Hence the new *theological logos* only achieves rule as also a hopeful pragmatics and a trusting erotics (a theme which in her later works Gillian Rose enunciated in a newly seminal fashion).[63] Nonetheless, this *logos* which does not seek only to rule, nor to subordinate force and passion to rule, can alone fully rule and indeed *does* rule (unlike modern western states and economies) whether we observe this rule or not. It alone can fully rule and fully heal. But not rule the city or cosmos, nor heal the soul, for all three have been exposed as illusory spheres of self-government, founded in the echo-chamber of myth, and subject to irresolvable *aporias*. Instead of the tale of this *logos*, one can at least be open to receiving the story of another one, a story indeed not foundable by reason, and yet which narrates a reconceived reason as co-terminous with the force and longing of narrative itself. This *logos* of government-by-the-other is, I submit, though not demonstrable, at least not subject to the dissolving antinomies of the older one and indeed—albeit through the course of more than a mere immanent development—it resolves these antinomies. (To this degree I am prepared to be Hegelian.)

No ruling or healing then of city, soul or cosmos. But instead a simultaneous ruling-healing—and so we need a different word—of relations. Augustine cites the classic definition of the just soul: 'it gives to all their due', that is to say, according to its own measures and that of the city, it gives what is 'proper' to others and retains what is 'proper' for itself.[64] But in order to refuse

'justice', and embrace the Good as an exercise of judgement only with and through 'right desire', Augustine cites Paul's *Epistle to the Romans* (13:8): 'owe no man anything except to love one another'. The soul is therefore only its proper self in the infinite return of a debt to others, a debt perpetually renewed in every repayment, and owed only *because* freely given.

So no debt at all, but delirium of arrival.

*In Memory of Gillian Rose**

NOTES

* This paper was delivered at a conference on 'The Soul and the City' held at Warwick University on 9th December 1995. The conference was organised by Gillian Rose, who died on the evening of the same day.

1 George Dumézil, *Jupiter, Mars, Quirinus* (Paris: Gallimard, 1941); *Mitra-Varuna* (Paris: P.U.F., 1949); *Les Dieux des Indo-Européens* (Paris: P.U.F, 1952); J-P Vernant, *Myth and Society in Ancient Greece*, trans. Janet Lloyd (Brighton: Harvester, 1980). C. Scott Littleton, *The New Comparative Mythology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).

2 See Pierre Clastres, *Society Against the State*, trans. Robert Hurley (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977) and G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, trans. Brian Massumi (London: Athlone, 1987), pp. 242ff, 351, 424ff.

3 See Wouton W. Belier, *Decayed Gods: Origin and Development of Georges Dumézil's 'Idéologie Tripartie'* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991). Belier notes that Dumézil originally used the evidence of Propertius, *Elegy IV*, I, 9–32 that there were three Roman tribes—*Ramnes, Tities, Luceres*—to support the thesis that this reflects a tripartite hierarchic structure in practice, but later suggested this was only an ideal requirement. But Belier's claim that the equal size of these three 'tribes' belies reference to a class division is not necessarily convincing (idealizing arithmetic was often applied to the city-state). For further scepticism, see Colin Renfrew, *Archaeology and Language: The Puzzle of Indo-European Origins* (London: Penguin, 1989), pp. 251–9.

4 Dumézil, *Mars, Jupiter, Quirinus*, pp. 63–8; Émile Senart, 'Rajas et la Théorie L'Indienne des trois Gunas', *Journal Asiatique* 2 (1915), pp. 151ff.

5 Plato, *Republic*, Books VIII and IX; *The Statesman*.

6 See Louis Dumont, *Homo Hierachicus*, trans. M. Sainsbury (Chicago: Chicago U.P., 1970); Serge Tcherkezoff, *Dual Classification Reconsidered*, trans. M. Thom (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1983).

7 R. I. Page, 'Dumézil revisited', in *Saga-Book*, vol XX, Parts 1–2 (1978–9), pp. 49–69; Georges Dumézil, *Gods of the Ancient Northmen* (Berkeley: California U.P., 1973).

8 Julius Caesar, *Gallic Wars VI*, 13. There are *duo genera hominum*; *druides* and *equites*, whilst the rest of society, ruined by debts, is forced to solicit slavery.

9 John Brough, 'The Tripartite Ideology of the Indo-Europeans: An Experiment in Method', in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 22 (1957), pp. 68–86. See Georges Dumézil, 'L'Ideologie Tripartie des Indo-Européens et la Bible', *Kratylos IV* (1958).

10 See Scott Littleton, *The New Comparative Mythology*, pp. 196, 202, 209.

11 J. P. Mallory, *In Search of the Indo-Europeans*, p. 271; Dumézil, *Jupiter, Mars, Quirinus*, p. 41.

12 See Nirad C. Chaudhuri, *Hinduism* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1979); Karl H. Potter, *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies* (Westport: Greenwood, 1963), pp. 3–15; John Milbank, 'The End of Dialogue' in Gavin D'Costa (ed.), *Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered* (New York: Orbis, 1990), pp. 174–92.

13 See Marcel Detienne, *Daimon: De la Pensée Religieuse à la Pensée Philosophique: La Notion de Daimon dans le Pythagorisme Ancien* (Société d'Edition «Les Belles Lettres», Paris, 1963); J-P Vernant, 'The Individual within the City-State', in *Mortals and Immortals* (Princeton, Princeton U.P., 1991), pp. 318–35. One should also note that, according to Dumézil, the first function was divided into a kingly and priestly role, with significant variations between Indo-European cultures. In India the priestly (Brahmanic) function was supreme, in Greece

it was relatively independent and sometimes marginalized (hence the Pythagoreans); in Celtic lands the druids possessed a guild solidarity surpassing their fealty to kings, whereas in Rome the *flamen dialis* was fully *captus* by the political power. It was *this* circumstance, Dumézil claimed, which permitted Rome to be uniquely disciplined and all-conquering. See *Jupiter, Mars, Quirinus*, pp. 123–5.

14   Renfrew, *Archaeology and Language*.
15   See Colin Renfrew, *The Megalithic Monuments of Western Europe* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1983); *Before Civilization* (London: Penguin, 1990), pp. 235–72.
16   See Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*; Mallory, *In Search of the Indo-Europeans*, pp. 111, 135, 166ff.
17   See Marcel Detienne, *Les Maîtres de la Verité dans la Grèce Archaique* (Paris: Maspero, 1967), pp. 1–8.
18   See Baldick, *Homer and the Indo Europeans*, pp. 25–27. In Ancient Ireland, Queen Medb wanted a husband without jealousy (of another ruler) fear or avarice: Dumézil, *Jupiter, Mars, Quirinus*, p. 115; and 'the three oppressions of the Isle of Britain' concern *government* (the race of men who hear every word spoken in the island), *war* (the two dragons who fight and paralyse all life) and *food* (the magician who steals in the night the provisions of the magic cauldron stored in the palace). Dumézil, *L'Ideologie Tripartie des Indo-Européens* (Brussels: Latomus, 1958), p. 20.
19   For the Indian material, see Senart, '*Rajas et la Théorie L'Indienne des trois Gunas*'; Didier Pralon, '*Le Modèle Tripartie dans la Philosophie du IVe Siècle BC*', in *Pour un Temps: Georges Dumézil* (Paris: Pandora, 1981) pp. 121–36; Dumézil, *Jupiter, Mars, Quininus*, pp. 63–7, 195–7, 257–60. Dumézil notes equivalent Roman cosmic divisions into *numina caelestia, media* and *terrestia*, citing Servius's *Commentary on Hesiod* III, p. 134 and VIII. See also *Rig Veda* X, p. 90. After the dismembering of the primordial human victim of the first sacrifice, the brahmans emerged from his mouth, the warriors from his arms, and the farmers from his thighs; at the same time the cosmic sky from his head, the local atmosphere from his navel and the earth from his feet. For Xenophon, see *Anabasis* III, I 6–12, VI, I 22, VII 8, 107, and J-P Vernant, '*Aspects de la Personne dans la Religion Grecque*', in *Mythe et Pensée chez les Grecs: Étude de Psychologie Historique* (Paris: Maspero, 1965), pp. 267–82.
20   See Senart, '*Rajas*', and Dumézil, *Mars, Jupiter Quirinus*, pp. 64–7, 94–9; Marcel Detienne, *Les Maîtres de la Verité*, pp. 1–8, 16ff; A. Yoshida, '*Survivances de la Tripartition fonctionelle en Grèce*', *Revue de l'Histoire de Religion* (1964), pp. 21–38; J-P Vernant, *Les Origines de la Pensée Greque* (Paris: P.U.F., 1962), pp. 110–111.
21   Dumézil, *Jupiter, Mars, Quirinus*, p. 17.
22   Jean-Pierre Vernant, '*Le Mythe Hésiodique des Races*', in *Mythe et Pensée chez les Grecs* (Paris: Maspero, 1978), pp. 13–80; '*Oedipus without the Complex*', in J-P Vernant and P. Videl-Naquet, *Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece* (New York: Zone, 1990), esp. pp. 97–8.
23   Julian Baldick, *Homer and the Indo-Europeans: Comparing Mythologies* (London: I. C. Taurus, 1994); see also Didier Pralon, '*Le Modèle Tripartie*'. Pralon suggests plausibly that the pre-Socratic democratic/military paradigm in Greece (concentrated around *isonomia*) was alien to the tripartite model, which surfaces only with philosophy. On the other hand, one should take seriously Detienne's view (*Daimon*) that the Pythagorean/Philolaen tradition may preserve traces of much older tradition from a common Indo-European stock. Pralon lists the apparent traces of tripartition in Aristotle's *Politics* as well as Plato's *Republic*. Adding to Pralon, one can list these as: 1. Hippodanus of Miletus divided the city into three parts: sacred, public, private, servicing worship, war and agriculture (*Politics* II, 8); 2. [not in Pralon] there are three different motives for stealing: to enjoy without pain (its remedy is philosophy; so one has a perversion of 'first function' virtue), covetousness (related to the second function 'spiritedness') and sheer need (the third function) (II, 7); 3: Aristotle himself recommends a threefold division of the land of the city into public for gods, public for communal feeding (especially related to war) and private (VII, 10). 4: there are three in-gredients of excellence: intellectual and moral, bodily ('spiritedness' athleticism, health), and external needs (VII, i.); 5: One needs wealth to support religion, war and material needs (VII, 9) and this gives rise to a division of social order into priests, judges and councillors (as with Plato, and for Greece in general, the military and the ruling functions are intimately linked) and farmers and artisans. For Aristotle only the military and

deliberating classes contain full citizens: thus he upholds also the hierarchic aspect of Indo-European tripartition. Pralon also discusses tripartition in Pindar and other writers.

24 René Descartes, *Discourse on the Method*, trans. John Cottingham et al, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, Vol. One (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1985). Part two, VI, 11. And see Catherine Pickstock, *After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation in Philosophy*, chapter two, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997).

25 Plato, *Republic* 368.

26 See Détienne, *Daimon: De la Pensée Religieuse à la Pensée Philosophique*, pp. 23–4.

27 *Republic* 433–4.

28 See Adi Ophir, *Plato's Invisible Cities: Discourse and Power in the Republic* (London: Routledge, 1991).

29 Plato, *Phaedo* 68C–69E.

30 *Republic* 505a; 521a; 'good and prudent life', 582a: 'By what must things that are going to be judged be judged? Isn't it by experience, prudence and argument?'

31 See Luce Irigaray, *Speculum of the Other Woman* (Cornell: Cornell U.P., 1985).

32 See Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Inoperative Community*, trans. P. Connor et al. (Minneapolis: Minnesota U.P., 1991), esp. pp. 1–43.

33 *Republic* 488–5012.

34 Nancy, *The Inoperative Community*.

35 Louis Dumont, 'De L'Individu hors du Monde à l'Individu dans le Monde', in *Essais sur L'Individualisme* (Paris: P.U.F., 1983), pp. 33–67; J-P Vernant, 'The Individual within the city-state'. Vernant points out that the Pythagoreans and their heirs were 'dissenters', unlike the gurus, and argues that Greek military *isonomia* engendered a much more egalitarian mode of individualism. However, the role of 'hero' also traces from that of an *outsider*, from the one who first *escapes* the fixed cosmos of sacral kingship—as even in the case of the epic of Gilgamesh: 'Unlike the Omnipotent pharaoh, a deity incarnate from whom flowed the sustenance of nature and society, the hero of the epic, the prototype of the King, was cast against an alien world from which he attempted to wrest order' declares John G. Gunnell, in *Political Philosophy and Time: Plato and the Origins of Political Vision* (Chicago: Chicago U.P., 1987), p. 40. (And see the account of Odysseus in T. Adorno and M. Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. John Cumming (London: Verso, 1992), pp. 43–81.) This hero figure is *also* moved by an ideal of ascetic 'self-government' which concerns the regulation of the passions, through here for a more functional end. In a sense *isonomia* is like *decapitated* tripartition (and in this respect also proto-Cartesian). While I argue in the main text below that the hierarchic 'entrapment' of *thumos* between above and below helps to create a notion of 'the interior', a mere hierarchy of two plus heterogeneity is *also* sufficient to generate the notion of an inner unspecified 'middle' between two poles. Indeed, heterogeneity *alone* can generate interiority: this is the case for the relation of Dumézil's kingly and priestly aspects of the highest function in *Mitra-Varuma*. As Detienne and Guattari remark, this 'forms a *milieu* of interiority': *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 351.

36 See George Duby, *The Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: Chicago U.P., 1980), pp. 6, 45, 113–118. Duby discusses the way in which the threefold feudal scheme (hierarchical and heterogeneous) was in tension with a hierarchy inherited from Dionysius the Areopagite (with an ultimately Trinitarian basis)—of divine signs/initiating/initiated. Here, first, the topmost authority is *not* personified except in God, and hence the 'top' is truly transcendent and ineffable in character, not the upper part of a single whole, but the *source of meaning of the whole*. Secondly, there is no heterogeneity, since one can be *initiated upwards*. Such a hierarchy is used as the basis for a *conciliarist* ecclesiology by Nicholas of Cusa in *The Catholic Concordance*, trans. Paul E, Sigmund (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1991) Book 1. However, by the end of the Middle Ages it had become rare, and ecclesiastical hierarchy was being conceived in more 'physical' terms with personified authority on top, instead of the mysterious symbolic presence of an ineffable deity giving itself eucharistically through time (see Henri de Lubac, *Corpus Mysticum* [Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1949].)

This later development owes something to the increasing intrusion of 'Indo-European' tripartite ideology: as Duby records, (pp. 45, 115) Adalbert already found the Dionysian scheme too 'mystical', and rejected also the Gelasian scheme of two 'powers', ecclesial and lay (with the latter subordinate) in favour of a threefold hierarchy of *oratores*, *bellatores*

and *laboratores* which (a) gave the feudal classes constitutional power, and (b) reduced ecclesiastical power to a more legalistic kind of entitlement.

37 *De Trinitate* VII, 9.
38 *Civitas Dei* XI, 24–27: '[The City of God] is strong with God's eternity; it shines with God's truth; it rejoices in God's goodness' (24); [all philosophers agree that] 'there is some cause underlying nature, some form of knowledge, some supreme principle in life. There are also three things looked for in any artist: natural ability, training and the use to which he puts them. Those are needed for any real achievement; and his ability is judged by his talent, his training by his knowledge, his use of them by the enjoyment of the fruits of his labour' (25); 'we resemble the divine Trinity in that we exist; we know that we exist, and we are glad of this existence and this knowledge' (26).
39 *Civitas Dei* xi, 25–27; *De Musica Six*, 11, I: 'delight is a kind of weight in the soul'; *De Trinitate* IX, chap. 12, 17.
40 *Civitas Dei* IX, 9–16.
41 *De Trinitate* XV, 10, 17. The triad of 'talent, learning and use' appears related to the rhetorical triad.
42 Augustine, *Confessions* I, i.
43 *Civitas Dei* XV. 5. John Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), pp. 380–438.
44 See Catherine Osborne, *Eros Unveiled: Plato and the God of Love* (Oxford: O.U.P., 1994), pp. 201–19.
45 *De Trinitate*, IX, I.
46 *Confessions* III, 2 X, 25; *Civitas Dei* X, 3, 4.
47 See Dominique Dubarle, '*Essai sur l'Ontologie Théologale de St. Augustin*' in *Dieu Avec L'Être* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1986), pp. 167–258. One should also note that, unlike Aquinas, Augustine makes *no* absolute distinction of 'one essence' versus 'three persons', and is quite prepared to elide person/essence (VII, 4). It is somehow for him that there is a single *essentia/persona* necessarily repeated twice—once as a relation, and second as a relation to this relation. This scheme makes it absolutely clear that there is in God no phantom *genus* divisible into species—it is not, as Augustine says, as if the essence were like gold formable into three different statues (VII, 11).
48 *De Trinitate* I, 22–31; V.
49 See Rowan Williams, 'The Paradoxes of self-knowledge in the *De Trinitate*', in J. I. Liebhard, et al. (eds), *Collectanea Augustiniana* V (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), pp. 121–34; 'Sapientia and the Trinity: Reflections on the *De Trinitate*' in B. Bruning et al. (eds), *Mélanges J. J. Van Bovel* (Leuven: Leuven U.P., 1990), pp. 317–32; Lewis Ayres, *The Beautiful and the Absent: Anthropology and Ontology in Augustine's De Trinitate* (Oxford D.Phil. Thesis 1995, unpublished).
50 *De Trinitate*, I. There is a primacy here of time and language over space. For in Book I i of this work, Augustine explains that the 'way of faith' does not speak of ideas *either* in purely corporeal terms, *or* in purely psychic terms, *or* yet in purely *ineffable* terms. This appears to exclude all possibilities, yet Augustine explains that the way of faith, exemplified in the discourse of Sacred Scripture, draws from *both* bodily and psychic images, and then *rises gradually* to the ineffable: 'sublime and sacred things'. The point here then is first that the way of faith is 'analogical', but second, that analogy *takes time*: 'one rises gradually'. Thus it is remaining in time that pays tribute to both the ineffability and yet plenitude of eternity; whereas this tribute cannot be paid by merely static, 'spatial' representations. Augustine also stresses that the Father and the Holy Spirit must manifest themselves just as much within finite structures as the Son, albeit not in the mode of 'incarnation': thus the Father is manifest as a calling 'voice' (VI, 4), the Spirit as a *hovering* dove and flames and as *our* gift as well as God's (since a gift belongs to the receiver as much as to the giver). There is hence absolutely *no* truth in Karl Rahner's allegation (Karl Rahner, *The Trinity*, trans. J. Donceel [London: Sheed and Ward 1970]) that Augustine fails to have an adequate economic analogue for the presence of the Holy Spirit in the Church, equivalent to the Incarnational presence of the Son—thereby opening the way for a supposed shift from a concern with the historical economy as a necessary mode of access to knowledge of the Trinity in favour of an ontological speculation ungrounded in revelation. In fact, to the contrary, Augustine stresses still more than Rahner a mediation of Trinitarian presence only via finite image.

First, Augustine strongly insists that the 'substance' of the hypostasis of a trinitarian person never actually 'appears' in its finite manifestation, *even* in the case of the incarnation; its personhood is only apparent within a pattern of image and symbol ('what appeared … was not the very substance of the Word of God in which he is equal to the Father and Co-Eternal, nor the very substance of the Spirit … but something created which could be formed and came into being in those ways': *De Trinitate* II, 27). Second, the persons act unitedly *ad extra* for Augustine, precisely because their distinction *cannot* be disclosed in any idolatrous and fictional interlude 'between' Creator and created, but *only* as a 'trace' within the structures of creation itself. By contrast, any suggestion of some sort of recognizable distinction of the persons in their economic activity—one more creating, the other more saving, the third more perfecting, etc.—(as advocated by Yves Congar and others) does *not* do justice to the primacy of history, since it postulates events in a mythical 'not quite yet created' realm. Where Rahner suggests the identity of the immanent with the economic Trinity, it is much more that for Augustine there is *no* economic Trinity, but rather the full subsumption of one sequence of time into the immanent Trinity—a subsumption only disclosed to us through the usual means of finite disclosure—such that all Time is re-disclosed as echoing the creator, the Trinitarian God. There is a further and quite crucial irony here. Rahner and others imagine that Augustine is inaugurating a kind of 'decadence' which speculatively removes theology from the reading of Scripture. But in reality, the refusal of the primacy of the Augustinian *vestigia* by Rahner, *precisely repeats just such a decadence*. For, as Henri de Lubac pointed out (*Corpus Mysticum*, p. 274) the crucial 'betrayal' in history of Trinitarian doctrine occurred not with Augustine, but rather with Gilbert de la Porrée, who first deemed the reflections on the *vestigia* to be a mere optional extra—simple 'comparisons'—and not the prime site for Theology itself. Gilbert could only make this claim because he had already reduced the revelation of the Trinity to a kind of *datum*, upon which a dialectical theology could surmount deductions, whereas the Augustinian reflections assume that what one starts with is rather symbols and images which need a complex decoding involving first scriptural exegesis, and then a kind of 'phenomenological' as well as logical reflection on the realities of remembering, speaking and aspiring to which these images allude. Hence the Augustinian approach, for which the unravelling of *vestigia is* Trinitarian theology, *conserves* the belonging together of *lectio* and *ratio* which Rahner purports to restore, and yet, in Gilbert's distant wake, still in fact deserts (for a positivism at once 'rationalistic' and 'mythological').

51   *De Trinitate* VIII, 10–14.
52   *De Trinitate* IX, 2–8.
53   *De Trinitate* X, 17–19; XI, 11–12.
54   *De Trinitate* X, 13, 19; VIII, 12.: 'For just as a word both indicates something and also indicates itself, it does not indicate itself as a word, unless it indicates that it is indicating something, so too does love indeed love itself, but unless it loves itself loving something, then it does not love itself as love. Who, therefore, does it love, except that which we love with love?' For Augustine, *each* aspect of the soul: memory, understanding and love, is *radically intentional* and indeed, in the passage of *De Trinitate* where he enunciates a *cogito* (X, 5–15), Augustine denies that the soul is an 'essence' in the usual sense, and instead declares that that which we cannot doubt is its relationality: the soul is knowledge, because it is knowledge *of* something (likewise memory and love of something). Hence we should take relationality—intentional knowledge—as its essence. The difference from Descartes here concerns 1. a more ecstatic intentionality which precludes any scepticism concerning the existence of the external world; 2. a more emphatic incorporation of love and will into intentionality; and 3. an insistence that all knowledge is memory, such that if a knowing awareness is always a trace it cannot be primarily a supposed 'mirror' of an external world, but is constituted as a 'fold' of an extra-personal process. At VIII, 9, Augustine also insists that one can only love (and know oneself as one's true self) if one is *just* towards others.
55   *De Trinitate* VIII, 10; also 4, 8, 9. In these passages the soul knows itself most of all, but its essence is justice, giving each thing its due, and *what* is due is love to God and neighbour. The point here is *not* that we most know ourselves by a kind of 'inner glance', but rather that the soul is not something that can be looked at as an 'example' or a genus; instead it is known *within intentional activity*. (One may note here that, even with Descartes, the *cogito* involves an awareness of being the subject of the *passions* as well as of cognition. This might

seem to imply an ecstatic element, as with Augustine, although Descartes' functional and not gnoseological role for the passions seems to me finally to belie this: see Michel Henry, 'The critique of the subject', in E. Cadava, et al. (eds) *Who Comes After the Subject?* (New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 157–166.)

56 *Confessiones* X, 8: *Magna ista vis est memoriae, magna numis, deus, penetrale amplum et infinitum: quis ad fundum eius pervenit? et vis est haec animi mei atque ad meam naturam pertinet, nec ego ipse capio totum quod sum. De Trinitate* XV, 42: 'to put it in a nutshell we can say: "It is I who remember, I who understand, I who love with all three of these things—I who am not either memory or understanding or love, but have them." This indeed can be said by one person who had these things and is not himself these three things' (Augustine goes on to say that by contrast God *is* these three things; the implication of the above sentence then seems to be that what the mind is—a reflection of the Trinity as memory, understanding and will—is also *not* itself, but more than itself: God. For while 'I' am not love and knowledge, they are still not *in* me (or my mind) like qualities in a subject, for after all they *are* me (IX, 5).

57 Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self* (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1989), pp. 115–159.

58 *De Musica*, Book Six i; *De Immortalitalis Animae: Confessiones* III, 6; every *corpora* has a *vita* and an *anima*. And see Emilie Zum Brunn, *St Augustine: Being and Nothingness* (New Hyorm: Paragon, 1988), pp. 9–22; K. Flasch, *Augustine: Einführung in Sein Denken* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1980). Zum Brunn discusses how for Augustine (1) *both* soul and body are mutable (*De Trinitate* III, 8) while *both* also are indestructible although the body is divisible *ad infinitum*), and (2) How a body like a soul is more in being when better formed by beauty; the 'form' of a body is not identical with any of its parts and only *these* are entirely destructible and purely nothing. What is *real* in a body as in a soul is participation in eternal being. Hence there is something in Augustine highly analogous to the denial of any ontological status to materiality as pure receptivity such as one finds with the Cappadocians. In both cases, creation *ex nihilo* seems to imply an ontological monism that almost obliterates the spirit/matter distinction. (The above perceptions also indicate for Zum Brunn just how essentially Augustinian *Eckhart* is).

59 *Confessiones* Books X–XI. As regards Augustine on time my tentative reading can be summarized as follows: (1) time is created by God, not by the soul as for Plotinus (*Enneads* III, 7, 71) so it is real and 'external'. (2) The past and future 'are not', nor is the present, since it instantly vanishes. (3) Past and future 'are present' only in the soul, yet this does not cancel the *aporia*, for 'presence' is not really present in the soul either. What one 'measures' is not presence *to* the soul but *distensio animi*: the soul is 'scattered', 'dispersed' in time. (4) *De Musica* indicates that *every res* is composed of 'time spans'—tensional traces and foreshadowings—that have ontological priority over 'space spans'. This allows one to marry the creationist realism with 'the psychic essence' of time without attributing any idealism to Augustine (a hermeneutic assumption of coherence permits this invocation of the earlier text), and thereby to show that Augustine *fully anticipates* Heidegger, despite the latter's denial. (5) The aporia is not resolved: if time is psychic, the *psyche* is also temporal and thereby itself enmeshed, 'lost' in the aporias of time. For that reason we are to leave distention in time for the *intention* of God. We are to make the ecstatic leap into eternity. (6) Yet elsewhere Augustine seems to insist on *remaining* in time to get to God. *Intention* and *Distention* appear to be resolved *Christologically*. One only intends God via Christ: thus if the answer to what is time is 'self', then the answer to 'what is self' is not simply dispersal *or* intention, but rather the receiving back of our true self from Christ via the Church. Hence Christ restored the true process of time; Christ *is* time, and in receiving Christ we do not resolve the *aporia* (for only God in eternity *outside* time literally comprehends it, and time is, as it were, the evidence that finitude is of *itself* a void), but we discover that we are to 'comprehend' time as the mystery of the possibility of charity, of giving and of coinherence. Hence the only graspable meaning of time is an *ethical* one; time is the time of *cura* (care)—as Heidegger will attempt to repeat.

60 *De Trinitate* II, 7–11; V, 16; VI, 4: Augustine says here that the Holy Spirit as divine gift is as much ours (the recipient) as God's the donor, *unlike* the Father and the Son (who is only 'equally human' with one man). Hence it is clear that (a) the Spirit includes us radically within the substantive relations of the Trinity; (b) that this inclusion amounts to a *radical reciprocity* in which we are elevated into a 'giving back of God to God'—although entirely

within and by God—despite our constitutive nothingness; (c) that it also implies *some* kind of equivalent of the 'hypostatic union' between Jesus and the logos as occurring between *all* redeemed people and the Holy Spirit. This makes utter nonsense of any idea that Augustine began to substitute a hypostasised notion of grace for salvation as the gift of the Holy Spirit.

61 *Confessiones*, III, I, 6, 10, IV, I, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12. Zum Brunn, *St Augustine: Being and Nothingness*, pp. 9–22.
62 *Confessiones* III, 6: God is *interior intimo meo et superior summo meo*.
63 See Gillian Rose, *Mourning Becomes the Law* (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1996).
64 *De Trinitate* VIII, 9.